EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Owner-occupied property is the foundation of American economic life. When a family owns the home they live in — really owns it, land and all — they build equity instead of paying rent. They invest in their neighborhood because they have a stake in it. They weather economic shocks because they have an asset, not just a monthly obligation. They pass something on to their children. That is not sentiment. That is how generational wealth is built, how local economies stay stable, and how a free republic sustains the broad middle class that makes it function.

Broad homeownership is also the foundation of a fiscally sound federal government. When families own their homes, they do not need perpetual housing assistance. They are not dependent on Section 8 vouchers, rental assistance programs, or housing subsidies that flow straight from the U.S. Treasury into the bank accounts of corporate landlords. Every housing voucher paid to a Wall Street firm is a dollar that builds no equity for anyone except the investor — a permanent taxpayer subsidy to the people who need it least, extracted from the families who need it most. The current system does not help working families escape dependency. It institutionalizes it, at taxpayer expense, indefinitely.

America is in the midst of a homeownership crisis that is costing families and taxpayers alike. The median age of first-time homebuyers has surged to 40 years old — up from 33 in 2020 — as Wall Street equity firms, private equity funds, and foreign shell companies systematically outbid families using all-cash offers, algorithmic purchasing, and tax advantages unavailable to individual buyers. The national homeownership rate has stagnated at 65.7% while 21 million homeowners spend more than 30% of their income on housing. The more families are locked out of ownership, the more they depend on rental assistance. The more they depend on rental assistance, the more that assistance flows to the institutional landlords who displaced them. It is a machine that feeds itself — at public expense.

This proposal establishes a comprehensive Federal-State Two-Tier Framework to decisively shift the balance of residential real estate back to American families — and to end the taxpayer subsidy of institutional displacement. At its core: a hard cap of 6 single-family homes per entity, a mandatory divestiture timeline for current over-holders, closure of the shell-company loophole, and strong protections for manufactured housing community residents. Freeing American families to own their homes frees American taxpayers from paying indefinitely for the consequences of their not being able to.

Current Legislative Momentum (2026)

Rare bipartisan alignment exists: President Trump issued an Executive Order on January 20, 2026 barring large institutional investors from purchasing single-family homes. The bipartisan Homes for American Families Act (Hawley-Merkley) would amend the Sherman Antitrust Act to bar investment funds over $150M in assets from purchasing residential homes. Senate Democrats introduced the American Homeownership Act to strip corporate landlords of tax advantages. This proposal goes further and provides a durable, enforceable structural framework.

TIER 1: FEDERAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 The 6-Home Entity Cap

The centerpiece of this framework is a hard, uniform, nationwide cap: no entity — of any kind — may own more than 6 single-family residential properties (defined to include houses, condominiums, townhomes, and manufactured homes on owned land).

Who the Cap Applies To:

• Any corporation, LLC, partnership, trust, REIT sub-entity, or other non-natural-person legal entity
• Any individual acting in concert with affiliated entities (affiliation rules modeled after SBA affiliation standards to prevent fragmentation)
• Any foreign national or foreign-domiciled entity
• Private equity funds, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth vehicles, including all subsidiary SPVs and holding companies

Exemptions (Narrow and Defined):

• Owner-occupied primary residence plus up to 5 additional properties for natural persons (individual human beings only)
• Licensed homebuilders actively constructing for sale — inventory capped at 24 months of average annual sales volume
• Community Land Trusts and HUD-certified nonprofit housing organizations
• Probate estates in active settlement (24-month grace period)
• Accredited colleges and universities — for dormitories, on-campus apartments, graduate student housing, and faculty/staff housing directly tied to the institution’s educational mission. Applies only to housing owned and operated by the nonprofit or public institution itself, not for-profit subsidiaries or investment vehicles.
• K–12 school districts and charter school organizations — for teacher and staff housing programs designed to attract and retain educators in high-cost communities, subject to a cap of 50 units per district and a requirement that occupants be active employees.
• Vocational, trade, and community college programs — for student housing directly affiliated with on-campus programs, operated on a nonprofit basis.
• Religious and faith-based educational institutions — for housing that directly supports students and staff enrolled in or employed by an affiliated school, seminary, or university.
• HUD-certified transitional and supportive housing providers — including halfway houses, recovery housing, domestic violence shelters, and permanent supportive housing for individuals with disabilities or experiencing homelessness.
• Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA) properties and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) affordable developments — for the duration of active federal affordability covenants.

1.1a Educational and Institutional Housing Exemptions — Detail

The educational exemptions above serve a fundamentally different purpose than speculative residential accumulation. They are included to ensure the Act does not inadvertently disrupt the ability of schools, universities, and mission-driven institutions to house their own students, faculty, and staff. The following criteria govern all educational exemptions:

Qualifying Institutions:

• Accredited nonprofit and public colleges, universities, community colleges, trade schools, and vocational programs — including 2-year and 4-year institutions recognized by a federally recognized accrediting body
• Public K–12 school districts operating teacher/staff housing programs, limited to 50 units per district to ensure the exemption serves workforce recruitment and not investment
• Private nonprofit K–12 schools and charter schools operating staff housing tied to active employment at the institution
• Seminaries and religiously-affiliated educational institutions providing housing for enrolled students and employed faculty/staff

Qualifying Housing Types:

• On-campus dormitories and residence halls
• University-owned apartment complexes primarily occupied by enrolled students or employed faculty and staff
• Graduate student housing within reasonable proximity to campus, owned and operated by the institution
• Visiting faculty and scholar housing for temporary academic appointments
• Teacher housing programs in school districts where workforce housing is a documented barrier to educator recruitment (e.g., high-cost coastal communities, rural districts)

Conditions and Guardrails:

• Exemption applies only to housing owned directly by the qualifying institution — not to for-profit subsidiaries, investment arms, or LLCs created by the institution for non-educational purposes
• At least 75% of occupants must be enrolled students, employed faculty, or employed staff of the qualifying institution at all times. Spouses, domestic partners, and dependent children residing with a qualifying occupant are counted as part of that occupant’s household and do not count against the 75% threshold
• Institutions may not use the educational exemption to acquire speculative residential investment portfolios unrelated to their housing mission
• K–12 district exemptions require annual certification that occupants are active employees and that housing is offered below market rate as a recruitment benefit
• Institutions that sell or repurpose exempt housing must offer it under the standard divestiture priority order — first to first-time buyers, then to CLTs, then to local governments
• Institutions claiming the exemption must register qualifying properties in the FROR with an annual certification of ongoing eligibility

1.2 Mandatory Divestiture Timeline

All entities currently exceeding the 6-home cap must divest excess holdings according to a structured schedule:

First-Look Sale Priority (Divestiture Proceeds):

When entities divest under this Act, sales must be offered in this mandatory priority order:

• 1st Priority — Owner-occupant first-time homebuyers (90-day exclusive window)
• 2nd Priority — Community Land Trusts and nonprofit housing organizations (30-day window after first priority lapses)
• 3rd Priority — Local governments for affordable housing conversion (30-day window)
• 4th Priority — Any qualified buyer at fair market value

1.3 Shell Company Transparency Act (Federal)

The shell company loophole is how corporations masquerade as small investors. A single hedge fund may own 50,000 homes across 10,000 LLCs. This section closes that loophole.

Federal Requirements:

• Mandatory beneficial ownership disclosure for ALL residential real estate transactions, filed with FinCEN within 10 business days of closing
• No LLC, trust, corporation, or other entity may purchase residential real estate without disclosing the full chain of ownership to the natural person(s) who ultimately own or control the entity
• All-cash residential purchases above $200,000 require disclosure to a publicly searchable Federal Residential Ownership Registry (FROR)
• Aggregation rule: all properties owned by affiliated entities — defined as entities sharing beneficial owners, officers, financing, or management — are counted together toward the 6-home cap
• Violations: $100,000 fine per property plus automatic voiding of purchase within 180 days if ownership was concealed

Federal Residential Ownership Registry (FROR):

• A new public database administered jointly by HUD and FinCEN
• Searchable by owner name, beneficial owner, property address, county, and state
• Updated within 30 days of any property transfer
• Integration with county recorder databases via mandatory API standards
• Cross-referenced with IRS Schedule E filings and mortgage servicer data

1.4 Institutional Investor Tax Elimination

Current tax law subsidizes corporate landlords. This section eliminates those subsidies for entities over the 6-home cap:

• Eliminate mortgage interest deductions for all residential properties held by non-owner-occupant entities above the 6-home threshold
• Eliminate depreciation deductions on residential properties for covered entities
• Impose a 25% excise tax on net rental income from properties 7 and above within a covered entity
• Close the 1031 exchange loophole for single-family residential properties held by entities above the cap
• Revenue generated to fund the First-Time Homebuyer Assistance Fund (see Section 2.4)

1.5 Foreign Buyer and Sovereign Wealth Restrictions

• Ban on foreign nationals and foreign-domiciled entities purchasing single-family residential property in the United States
• CFIUS review required for any portfolio of 3 or more single-family homes being acquired by a foreign-connected entity
• Existing foreign-owned residential properties subject to a 3-year divestiture window
• Exemption for individual foreign nationals with valid U.S. permanent resident status — subject to the same 6-home cap
• Sovereign wealth fund investments in U.S. residential real estate prohibited outright

TIER 2: STATE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK

Federal law establishes the floor. States are empowered — and incentivized — to go further. States that adopt compliant frameworks receive priority access to the Homeownership Restoration Fund (a new $25B federal fund seeded from institutional investor tax revenues and divestiture fees).

2.1 State Compliance Standards (Minimum Requirements)

To receive federal Homeownership Restoration Fund allocations, states must enact:

• Adopt or exceed the 6-home entity ownership cap in state law
• Establish a State Residential Ownership Registry integrated with the FROR
• Require beneficial ownership disclosure on all residential deeds recorded in the state
• Establish a State Housing Enforcement Office with dedicated investigative authority
• Enact a 90-day first-look right for first-time buyers on all divestiture sales

2.2 Optional State Enhancement Provisions

States may layer additional protections above the federal floor:

2.3 Manufactured Housing Community (Trailer Park) Protections

Private equity has aggressively acquired manufactured housing communities (MHCs), then dramatically raised lot rents on residents who own their homes but not the land beneath them. This is not a market outcome. It is a deliberate extraction model — in many cases using government-backed financing to buy the land, tripling rents, then handing residents a welfare application in the same envelope. It frees neither the tenants nor the taxpayers. This proposal ends it.

Full Institutional Divestiture — No Cap, No Carve-Outs:

No entity that qualifies as an institutional investor under this Act may own any manufactured housing community. The standard is not a cap — it is a prohibition. Institutional-scale ownership of MHCs is incompatible with the housing security of working Americans and must be unwound entirely.

• Mandatory Divestiture: All institutional owners of MHCs must divest their full portfolios within 3 years of enactment. Sales must follow the resident-first priority order: resident cooperative (ROC model), qualified nonprofit housing organization, local government, then individual lot purchasers
• Eminent Domain Authority: Where institutional owners refuse to sell, federal and state governments are expressly authorized to exercise eminent domain to acquire MHC land and transfer it — with all existing infrastructure — to resident ownership. Compensation is calculated at community-anchored fair market value: the maximum valuation at which a resident cooperative can service the acquisition debt at a monthly lot rent not exceeding 25% of local area median monthly income. Pre-acquisition income streams establish the floor. What local families can actually afford establishes the ceiling. Not the inflated price institutional capital paid using government-backed leverage. Not rents the acquiring entity itself extracted. The price a private equity firm paid does not define the price residents must pay to reclaim their own community
• Proof of Concept: Resident-owned manufactured housing communities already exist and function — including directly adjacent to institutionally-owned parks. The mobile home park next to Arrowrock in Boise has the same kinds of homes and the same kinds of residents. Those residents own their lots. Their rent is not set by a private equity firm in Washington DC. They are not waiting on a concession letter. The answer is not theoretical. It is already there, sharing a property line with the problem. This legislation scales what already works
• GSE Financing Prohibition: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are prohibited from providing manufactured housing community loans to any institutional investor or large-scale corporate landlord. Government-backed capital may no longer be used as a tool to acquire MHCs for investor profit
• GSE Financing for Resident Buyouts: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac financing is redirected exclusively to resident cooperatives, ROC organizations, nonprofits, and local governments seeking to acquire MHCs from institutional owners. Where an institutional owner refuses to sell at community-anchored fair market value, eminent domain and GSE-backed community financing operate in tandem: the government acquires the land at a valuation capped so that resulting lot rents do not exceed 25% of local area median monthly income — not what institutional capital can bid — and residents take ownership through a cooperative or ROC structure with GSE loan support. The taxpayer’s capital built this problem. The taxpayer’s capital ends it
• Lot Rent Freeze: During the divestiture period, all lot rents in institutionally-owned MHCs are frozen at pre-acquisition levels. Concession structures that obscure the true rent obligation are void
• Welfare Subsidy Clawback: Where institutional rent increases caused residents to qualify for federal or state housing assistance, the difference between pre-acquisition rent and actual rent paid — up to the subsidy amount — is recoverable from the divesting entity as a condition of sale approval
• Closure notification: Any MHC owner intending to close or redevelop must provide 3 years notice and fund resident relocation assistance at full replacement cost
• Predatory fee ban: Prohibit all junk fees in MHC leases (move-in fees, background check markups, utility pass-through markups)

State MHC Requirements (Minimum):

• Establish a state MHC registry with ownership and lot-rent history
• Fund Resident Ownership Community (ROC) programs with state housing finance agency financing
• Authorize class-action enforcement by MHC resident associations
• Ban evictions without just cause in MHCs

2.4 First-Time Homebuyer Support Infrastructure

Removing speculative buyers is necessary but not sufficient. Families need affirmative help entering the market.

Federal Programs:

• First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit: $15,000 refundable federal tax credit for first-time buyers earning below 140% of area median income (AMI), phased out above 160% AMI
• Down Payment Assistance Matching Fund: Federal 2:1 match for state down payment assistance programs, capped at $25,000 per household
• Renovation Loan Reform: Streamline FHA 203(k) and expand access to purchase-renovation financing so first-time buyers can compete for fixer-uppers currently going to institutional cash buyers
• Starter Home Supply Incentive: $10,000 per-unit federal grant to builders constructing homes priced below 80% of local median home price

State Programs (to qualify for federal matching):

• State-chartered Community Land Trust capitalization programs
• Individual Development Account (IDA) matched savings programs for renters building down payments
• First-generation homebuyer assistance at 150% of federal tax credit for buyers whose parents never owned
• Zoning reform incentives: states that eliminate parking minimums and allow duplexes-by-right in residential zones receive additional housing fund allocations

ENFORCEMENT & ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION

3.1 Closing the Shell Company Game

The central enforcement challenge is entities restructuring to evade the cap. This section anticipates and closes those avoidance strategies:

3.2 Enforcement Architecture

Federal Enforcement:

• Primary enforcement: HUD Office of Residential Market Integrity (new office, $500M annual budget)
• DOJ Antitrust Division: Pursue Sherman Act violations for algorithmic bid coordination among investors
• FTC: Deceptive practices enforcement against investors misrepresenting ownership structures
• IRS: Audit cross-reference of Schedule E rental income against FROR database; automatic referral for entities showing rental income without registered ownership
• FinCEN: Beneficial ownership enforcement; authority to void transactions with concealed ownership

State Enforcement:

• State Attorneys General: Private right of action; authority to bring enforcement suits and seek disgorgement of profits from illegal ownership periods
• Qui tam provisions: Private citizens who report violations receive 20% of penalties collected
• County Recorders: Mandatory rejection of any deed transfer that does not include certified beneficial ownership disclosure

3.3 Penalty Structure

FUNDING & FISCAL ARCHITECTURE

4.1 Revenue Sources

This framework is designed to be substantially self-funding through the revenues it generates from institutional actors:

• Divestiture transaction fees: 1% federal fee on all divestiture sales required under this Act (estimated $3-8B over 5 years based on portfolio size estimates)
• Excise tax on excess holdings rental income: 25% excise tax on rental income from properties 7 and above (estimated $4-6B annually at full enforcement)
• Eliminated depreciation/mortgage interest deductions for covered entities (estimated $8-12B annually per Joint Committee on Taxation modeling of similar proposals)
• Shell company disclosure fees: $500 per property annual registration fee in FROR ($500M-$1B annually)
• Penalty revenues: Conservatively estimated at $1-2B annually at full enforcement

4.2 Expenditures

• Homeownership Restoration Fund: $25B over 5 years, distributed to states on a per-capita formula adjusted for housing cost burden
• First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credits: Estimated $12-18B annually at scale
• Down Payment Matching Fund: $5B annually
• HUD Office of Residential Market Integrity: $500M annually
• FROR build-out and maintenance: $300M in Year 1, $150M annually thereafter
• ROC Manufactured Housing Fund: $2B over 5 years

IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

SUMMARY: FEDERAL vs. STATE RESPONSIBILITIES

WHY OWNER-OCCUPIED PROPERTY RIGHTS MATTER

Property rights are worth defending. Idaho is right about that. But there is a difference between defending the property rights of the family that lives in a home and defending the portfolio interests of a private equity firm that has never set foot in the state. One builds communities. One extracts from them. One produces national strength. One produces national fragility.

Owner-occupied property is the bedrock of economic stability. When families own their homes — really own them, land and all — they build equity, invest in their neighborhoods, and have a stake in the future of their community. That stake is what produces stable local economies, stable families, and a citizenry with something to lose and something to protect. A nation of renters writing checks to Wall Street every month is a nation with no equity, no generational wealth, and no economic foundation that belongs to the people themselves.

That is not strength. That is dependency — just dependency on a different landlord.

Broad individual ownership of productive property is the oldest conservative idea in American history. Jefferson understood it. Lincoln understood it. The Homestead Act was built on it. The land should belong to the people who live on it — not to a financial instrument managed from another state. This proposal is not a departure from that tradition. It is a return to it.

HOW BOTH PARTIES BUILT THIS PROBLEM

The homeownership crisis did not happen by accident. It was built, step by step, by both parties — each making choices that seemed defensible at the time and whose costs were paid by working families years later. An independent voice in the Senate means being willing to say that plainly.

CONCLUSION

The United States did not become a renter nation by accident. It became one through deliberate policy choices: tax codes that reward landlordism over owner-occupancy, transparency rules so weak that a single hedge fund can own 50,000 homes through 10,000 LLCs, and a regulatory vacuum that allowed foreign equity and Wall Street to outcompete American families with tools — all-cash offers, algorithmic bidding, institutional financing — that no first-time buyer can match.

The American Homeownership Restoration Act reverses those choices. The 6-home cap, the shell-company transparency requirements, the divestiture framework with family-first sale priority, the full prohibition on institutional ownership of manufactured housing communities, the eminent domain mechanism to return land to the people who live on it, and the elimination of the tax advantages that made predatory accumulation profitable — together, these measures restore the structural conditions under which homeownership can again be the expected outcome for a working American family. They free the tenants. They free the taxpayers. Both at once.

The political moment is rare. Bipartisan consensus exists at the highest levels of government that large institutional investors do not belong in the single-family home market. This proposal gives that consensus the structural architecture it needs to succeed — not just at the margins, but at the roots.

People live in homes. Not corporations.